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Risk Sharing through Social Security 
Retirement Income Systems
A Comparison of Canada and the United States
Workers bear risk through variations in compensation due to changes in wage and
nonwage compensation, the hours and tenure on their job, and benefits from government labor
market programs.  Insights about worker risk-bearing can be gained through comparisons of the
Canadian and U.S. labor markets, which is the topic of a recently published Upjohn volume
(Turner 2001).  Labor markets in the two countries have many similarities (such as facing the
aging of the baby- boom generation) and many interconnections (they exchange more goods and
services than any other two countries in the world).   The social security old-age benefit programs
in Canada and the United States provide social insurance that reduces risk bearing by workers and
are one aspect of the pattern of risk-bearing in the two countries.  Perhaps because of societal
differences concerning the role of government, the Canadian and U.S. programs differ in ways
that affect the amount of risk-bearing they provide.  
While most analyses of retirement benefits focus on the expected level of pension benefits,
or on their rate of return or internal rate of return, the riskiness of retirement benefits and their
risk-bearing aspects are also important to workers.  A simple measure of the riskiness of
retirement benefits is the variability in their real value.  This measure is affected by factors
influencing the accrual of real pension benefits up to retirement (primarily wages and hours
worked) and by factors affecting the variability in the real value of benefits once benefit payment
has started, which is tied to the indexation of the benefits for inflation.
The simple measure of risk is inadequate because financial theory indicates that risk can be
considered only in the context of the total portfolio held by the retiree or worker.  The correlation
of pension risk with other risks the worker faces should be considered.  When retirement benefit
risks are positively correlated with job risks, the effects of retirement benefit risks are more
serious.  When retirement benefit risks offset job- related risks, the variability in retirement
benefits plays an insurance role.  
The primary income-producing asset of most workers is the human capital associated with
their job, which often has risks that are positively correlated with the risks of an occupational
pension plan (if one is provided).  Traditional defined- benefit pension plans tend to reward
longevity on a job, and thus any factor that increases the risk of losing one’s job also adversely
affects the value of the pension.  Social security, however, is an important part of the wealth
portfolio of most workers and is often structured so as to offset job-related risks, for example, by
allowing workers to exclude periods of low earnings when calculating benefit levels.  
Risk Bearing in Retirement Income Systems
Social security benefits in both Canada and the United States are provided by traditional
defined-benefit plans that determine benefits by applying a formula to the worker’s years of
service and earnings.  In structuring social security systems, a tradeoff occurs between providing
incentives and providing risk- bearing.  When social security benefits are perfectly tied to wages,
as in an individual account plan that bases contributions on wages, no risk-bearing is provided, but
rather the risks in terms of the level of benefits are correlated with job risks.  Risk-bearing in
social security can be provided by a defined-benefit plan by making the benefit formula or the tax
support progressive.  Income redistribution can be considered an aspect of risk-bearing
concerning risks to one’s labor market earnings. 
Canadian-U.S. Comparisons
 Risk-bearing concerning future retirement income in the Canadian and U.S. social
security systems can be compared along various aspects of retirement income risk, such as:
• wage risk due to unanticipated changes in the worker’s wages, 
• early retirement risk due to unanticipated changes in the age at which the worker retires, 
• longevity risk due to the uncertainty as to date of death, 
• demographic risk due to unanticipated changes in population age structure, 
• inflation risk due to unanticipated changes in the price level, 
• political risk due to unanticipated changes in taxes and the benefit formula, and 
• financial market risk due to unexpected fluctuations in asset prices.
While demographic risk is often the focus of discussions, age structure changes due to
fertility are completely known once a cohort has been born, and, from that point, the major risks
are due to immigration and mortality changes.  
Table 1 shows calculated replacement rates provided by social security to workers at
different levels of preretirement earnings.  Compared with the United States, social security
benefits in Canada are more progressive, being more generous for low-income workers and less
generous for high-income workers.
Not taken into account in the standard measures of progressivity, both the Canadian and
U.S. social security systems allow workers to exclude some low earnings years when determining
benefits.  For workers suffering a loss in earnings, this provision protects their social security
benefits from being reduced by that loss.
In the United States, for workers with more than 35 years of earnings, social security
excludes their lowest years when calculating benefits.  Thus, someone starting at age 18 and
working to 62 would have 44 years of work and 9 dropout years; someone starting at age 22
would have 40 years of work and 5 dropout years.
Table 1 Income Replaced by Social Security in the United States and Canada (U.S. $)
Individual’s
earnings
preretirement
($)
Old-age benefita
($)
U.S.
replacement rate
(%)
Canadian
replacement rate
(%)
         0         0 NA  NA
   6,450   5,087 79 130
  12,900   7,346 57   71
  19,350   9,606 50   51
  25,800 11,868 46   42
  51,600 13,764 27   21
129,000 13,764 11    8
aThe old-age benefit calculation assumes the worker retired at 65 in 1994 with average indexed annual
earnings shown in the left-most column.
SOURCE: Gunderson, Hyatt, and Pesando (1996).
In Canada, full-career workers eventually will be able to exclude their seven lowest years
of earnings (or 15 percent of their working years, whichever is lower, counting all years from age
18 to age 65), in calculating benefits.  Thus, for current lower-income workers who start working
at 18 and retire at 62, the Canadian system provides fewer dropout years than does the U.S.
system (6.6 vs. 9), providing less protection against periods of low earnings.  For someone
starting work at 22, the pattern is reversed with respect to the United States (6 vs. 5). 
Survivor’s benefits are more generous in Canada than in the United States for women who
have worked but less generous for women who never worked outside the home.  In Canada, a
surviving wife continues to receive her Old Age Security benefit, while that of her husband ends
at his death.  Thus, she receives 50 percent of the benefits they both received while her husband
was alive.  In addition, she receives 60 percent of the Canada Pension Plan benefit of her husband. 
She thus receives less than 60 percent of their joint benefits.  A U.S. woman who had never
worked outside the home would receive 67 percent of the joint benefit received by herself and her
husband while he was alive.  Indexation of benefits provides insurance against inflation during
retirement.  The United States provides full annual price indexation of benefits starting at
retirement.  Canada provides quarterly indexation of benefits for Old Age Security benefits. 
When inflation is low, the difference between quarterly and annual indexation is unimportant, but
in periods of high inflation, Canada provides better protection against inflation than does the
United States.
The progressivity of a retirement income system is affected both by the structure of
benefits and the structure of taxes used to finance the benefits.  The exclusion of the first
Can$3,500 of earnings from social security payroll taxes is a progressive feature of the Canadian
tax support for social security that is not present in the United States.  Also, Canada finances
roughly one-third of old-age benefits through general revenues.  General revenues, primarily from
personal income taxes, are a more progressive source of taxes than are social security taxes
because of the higher tax rates that apply to higher earners.  Thus, overall it appears that the
Canadian system is more progressive in its tax structure that supports social security financing.  
Conclusions
While in some ways the U.S. system provides greater protection against risks, overall it
seems the Canadian system provides greater insurance against income risks through the greater
progressivity of its financing and benefits.  For most women, it provides more generous survivor’s
protection, but it provides less generous protection for widows who have not worked. 
John A. Turner works in the Public Policy Institute of AARP.
Suggestions for further reading
Gunderson, Morley, Douglas Hyatt, and James E. Pesando.  1996.  “Public Pension Plans in the
United States and Canada.”  Prepared for the W.E. Upjohn Institute Conference on Employee
Benefits, Labor Costs, and Labor Markets in Canada and the United States, November 4–6, 1994.
Turner, John A., ed.  2001.  Pay At Risk: Compensation and Employment Risk in the United
States and Canada.  Kalamazoo, Michigan:  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.  
